The Private Paradox by Thompson, Grahame
The
PRIVATE
Paradox
Britain was the laboratory of the world's most sustained 
privatisation program. But the lessons are more than a 
little surprising. Grahame Thompson concludes that, 
for the Australian Left, regulation, not ownership, should
be the key issue.
T he pressures to privatise various public sector activities are growing on a global scale, and these pressures are ex­
pressed nowhere more strongly than in 
Australia at present. The UK can claim the some­
what dubious distinction of having pioneered 
this movement, and it has probably pushed the 
process further than most countries because of 
the head start it gained when a radical 'new 
Right' Conservative government was elected in 
1979 bent on 'transforming' Britain's admittedly 
creaking economy.
The main privatisations so far achieved in the UK are 
detailed in the adjacent table. This shows the formidable 
extent of the sale of publicly-owned business to date. If the 
UK Conservatives have their way and win the next general 
election, more sales can be expected — British Rail, British 
Coal and the prison service being the most likely targets.
Privatisation programs are usually discussed in terms of 
the increased resort to the market mechanism for organis­
ing and regulating the economic activity involved. Here I 
want to use the UK example to show that this charac­
terisation is too simple. In practice, things are far more 
complicated than generally recognised, particularly by
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The UK Privatisation Program —  
Main Companies Sold
Name of Company Year
Cable and Wireless 1981
British Aerospace 1981
Amersham International 1982
Britoil 1982
Associated British Ports 1983
Enterprise Oil 1984
British Telecom 1984
British Gas 1986
British Airways 1987
Rolls Royce 1987
British Airports Authority 1987
British Petroleum (31.5%) 1987
Water Authorities 1990
Electricity generation and distribution 1990
(Source: Various reports of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General.)
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those on the Left. The process of 'marketisation' has been 
accompanied by a process of deep regulation in the UK 
which has meant a closer public scrutiny of many of the 
post-privatised companies than they received while in 
public ownership.
The main point to drive home is that there has been a 
change in the form of intervention in the UK, rather than a 
simple withdrawal from intervention. This poses very im­
portant issues for the precise regulation of post-privatised 
companies in other countries now facing the full force of 
privatisation. The Left in the UK was totally unprepared 
for this issue and, as a result, it was the Right and tradition­
al economic arguments that drove the discussion about the 
post-public ownership regulatory regime.
1 begin with an obvious point but one that seems to have 
escaped many of those on the 'new Right' as well as on the 
'new Left'. It is impossible not to regulate industrially 
advanced, financially sophisticated, and internationally 
interdependent economies like those of Western Europe, 
North America and Australia.
Such economies demand an extensive regulatory and in- 
terventionary framework as a condition of their existence. 
Thus, despite calls for a withdrawal from intervention and 
a rhetoric that claims to produce this, the actual picture is 
considerably more complex. The general point here is that 
the usual way of conceptualising these issues — along a 
dimension of 'more or less' intervention — is neither a 
satisfactory nor a useful one. What is at stake is a change
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in the forms of intervention and regulation. The quantita­
tive dimension of 'more or less' is simply one aspect of the 
qualitative 'change in forms' dimension; it is not totally 
unimportant, but rather secondary.
The challenge is to specify the change in the forms of 
intervention over the period of the 'conservative turn', to 
assess the consequences of these, and to ask what the 
appropriate response might be from the Left.
Over much of the post-Second World War period three 
fairly distinct mechanisms of micro-economic intervention 
were legitimised within liberal democracies of the 
European, Australian and even North American type. 
These were subsidisation, regulation and nationalisation. 
Broadly speaking, it is these types of intervention that have
"The ' N e w  Right’ 
Conservatives have 
presided over one of the 
most sustained and rapid 
interventionary initiatives in 
British history."
been ideologically sanctioned by the 'legacy of liberalism'. 
I list them deliberately in the above order to indicate the 
degree to which the implied intervention challenges the 
established status quo of free market organisation.
Subsidisation challenges this the least in that the subject of 
this form of intervention need not necessarily respond 
positively to the offer of subsidisation, nor will it attract a 
penalty as a result (other than not receiving the subsidy, of 
course). This form of intervention is an indirect form be­
cause it encourages a particular type of response without 
directing it. On the other hand, regulation, as usually 
understood, is a direct form of intervention inasmuch as 
there is a penalty for non-compliance. For instance, polic­
ing is involved and legal or semi-legal sanctions can be 
brought to bear if the regulated activity does not conform 
to requirements. This mounts a greater challenge to the 
private decision-m aking of market agents. Finally, 
nationalisation represents the most serious and direct chal­
lenge to the established order since it transfers ownership 
of resources to a public body. Notice, however, that this 
remains a legitimate and sanctioned aspect of liberal social 
democracies in my schema. While this is clearly a con­
troversial claim, the way nationalisation was carried out 
and has functioned within mixed economies of the liberal 
type in the post-Second World War period tends, I would 
submit, to bear it out.
One important common characteristic that further justifies 
the combination of the above three forms of intervention, 
despite the differences between them, is that they all 
presume existing economic activity. The object of any of 
these interventionary mechanisms is already established 
prior to the attempt to subsidise, regulate, or nationalise it. 
Contrast this with a different form of intervention, one 
directed mainly at the industrial field — one that tries to 
establish new economic activity from the outset. Robust 
mechanisms to carry out this kind of 'intervention' within 
liberal democracies are very difficult to come by. Attempts 
at identifying gaps in the productive structure and seeking 
to fill them with publicly-controlled institutions have 
usually ended in failure. Such attempts are politically sen­
sitive because they contain the seeds of a type of economic 
practice that could exceed the legitimate bounds of the 
liberal and social democratic tradition.
Inasmuch as regimes of regulation involving these types 
of interventionary mechanisms became robustly estab­
lished in the post-war period, I would like to suggest they 
characterised a 'relatively extensive' system of interven­
tion. By this I mean the scope of intervention was wide; the 
mechanisms were complementary. There was some over­
lap, of course, and it is not always possible to separate 
clearly where one type of intervention began and another 
ended. But, by and large, these three mechanisms were 
conceived as separate types, fulfilling separate functions 
and, in the main, operated separately. The question is: what 
has become of them?
Some mechanisms remain firmly in place. For instance, the 
tax-subsidy method — always at the heart of the liberal 
interventionist framework — continues, albeit in a 
redirected form. It is important to recognise the con­
tinuities between the old, pre-conservative tum system, 
and what I will argue in a moment is the newly emerging 
one.
The most obvious transformation occurs with the idea of 
nationalisation in the UK and elsewhere. It no longer rep­
resents an interventionary mechanism but, rather, the 
reverse; a classic case of the withdrawal from intervention, 
many would argue. This claim, however, needs to be ap­
proached with caution. Again, it is perhaps better 
described as a change in the form of intervention. The 
traditional UK nationalised industries are being trans­
formed from large public monopolies into private ones, or 
sometimes into private duopolies, accompanied by a new 
extensive set of regulatory apparatuses. Even the water 
and electricity industries, which were not privatised as 
monopolies or duopolies, have attracted an extensive 
regulatory apparatus.
At this stage it may be useful to characterise these changes 
overall and then go on to justify this characterisation.
Above I suggested the post-1945 to mid-1970s regime of 
intervention was a 'relatively extensive' one. At present, I 
suggest, this is being replaced by a 'relatively intensive' 
one. This displays four main features. The first is a narrow­
ing of the field of operation of intervention involving 
restrictions on its scope (though this is offset somewhat by
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the growth of the new regulatory bodies outlined below). 
The second concerns a more intense 'gaze' directed at that 
economic activity under scrutiny from regulatory institu­
tions (again, some of which are new). The third main 
feature involves the establishment of a deliberately 
'layered' system of regulatory mechanisms. Finally, within 
a broad rule-driven regulatory structure, organisations 
have been given greater discretion to exercise autonomy in 
deciding the specific criteria for their individual assess­
ments. In general, the effect of this emerging regime has 
been to deepen the regulatory experience. Clearly, quite a 
complex pattern is being suggested here which I will now 
try to unpack.
One of the central features driving the moves towards 
privatisation was the idea of increased competition. But the 
manner of its conception was not the form of the traditional 
neo-classical notion of competition, which stressed a static 
equilibrating market made up of a number of competing 
units. Rather, it was a more pragmatic notion of competi­
tion that informed the discussion. As long as the market 
was potentially contestable this would serve the objective 
of competition well enough. The regulatory apparatus was 
constructed, at least in major part, to serve this end. But 
given the size of the organisations involved and the lack of 
any serious attempt to break them up, any challenge to 
their monopoly or near-monopoly position has rather 
remained a sentiment only. Despite repeated attempts by 
the government and the regulatory bodies to 'clip off' 
activities existing around the edges of the privatised 
companies' core business and subject these to competition, 
the impact on the companies has so far been marginal.
Monopolists have an incentive to exploit the market and 
duopolists to collude to divide it up. This is why a new set 
of regulatory bodies was seen to be needed to supervise the 
post-privatised companies. For the newly duopolised 
telecommunications industry in Britain, an Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL) was set up. For the monop­
olised gas industry a similar organisation, OFGAS, has 
been created. For privatised British Airways (which is 
subject to international competition) and the British Air­
ports Authority (which owns the major London airports 
and those in Scotland, and which is not subject to much 
competition), the already existing Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) has been revamped to provide the necessary 
regulatory apparatus. For the water companies, the Na­
tional Rivers Authority was created to supervise their 
supply arrangements. As the electricity supply industry is 
primed to become a set of privatised companies it, too, is 
to be subject to a new regulatory body.
The UK has experienced then the demise of one traditional 
interventionary mechanism — nationalisation — as 
another — regulation — has been expanded in its place. 
This is not a simple case of withdrawal to allow the market 
a freer hand. The crucial feature is the operation of these 
newly emerging regulatory apparatuses.
The prevention of outright and obvious abuse of 'monopo­
ly power' and the 'protection of the consumer interest' 
have remained the primary ostensible objectives of the 
regulatory bodies. OFTEL in particular has been surpris­
ingly diligent in pursuing the worse excesses of British 
Telecom. The general criteria by which these regulatory 
bodies are required to scrutinise involve the famous 'RPI- 
n%' formula. This sets the pricing framework within which 
the companies must operate. They are required to set their 
prices according to the formula 'retail price index - n%', 
where n% is some agreed figure for the company. Clearly, 
this is hardly the criterion of a non-interventionist; it goes 
to the heart of private sector decision-making. In addition, 
'maintaining regulatory vigilance' has forced OFTEL to go 
further and inquire into rates of return on capital employed 
of British Telecom (BT), and its duopolist rival Mercury 
Communications. Quality control has now entered the
"But these are not markets 
in the usual sense... 
,  price is not used to 
determine where resources 
are located...”
regulator's vocabulary as well. And OFTEL has the power 
to consider any merger that either BT or MC might 
propose. Thus, in effect, OFTEL has at least a potential to 
influence all the central financial decisions either company 
is likely to make. The same goes for other the other 
regulatory bodies.
Another feature of the post-privatised regulatory regime is 
the way the government has retained a 'golden share' in a 
number of the companies, which allows the government 
wide powers to block certain shareholdings, to influence 
variations in voting rights, share issues, disposal of assets, 
and other matters.
All in all, these measures trawl in most of the major finan­
cial decisions that the privatised companies are likely to 
make. To exercise their powers, the regulatory bodies have 
initiated very detailed analyses of the companies' cost and 
revenues structures, their investment programs and their 
general business strategies. They have devised elaborate 
contracting arrangements to protect customers. Thus, they 
have been forced to install a very deep regulatory structure, 
with wide powers of investigation.
With respect to those industries where a number of 
separate companies were already in existence (the water 
industry), or where they could be easily created out of the 
existing industry structure (electricity supply), a different 
form of regulation has arisen. This is known as 'yardstick' 
regulation, and it involves comparisons between the 
various component companies within the industry. Al­
though these do not extensively compete between each 
other, their regulatory targets can be set according to best 
practice comparisons between them, thus in theory allow­
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ing a more hands-off approach to development. The prac­
tical consequences of this form of regulation have, how­
ever, yet to emerge.
One very interesting feature of the privatisation of the 
electricity supply is the creation of an 'internal market' for 
electricity within the newly privatised operational structure, 
involving a complex set of contractual arrangements between 
the power generation arms of the industry and the distribu­
tion companies. Nobody is yet sure how, or whether, this 
'market' will actually work. It is illustrative, however, of a 
number trends within the UK public sector where 'internal 
markets' have been set up (in health and education services). 
But these are not markets in the usual sense of the term and 
should not be confused with a traditional 'marketisation' of 
economic activity. They are highly regulated; price is not used 
to determine where resources are located — budgets are set 
'prior' to providing a supply so 'cost minimisation' becomes 
the main objective.
A final aspect of the new regime is what I would describe 
as its 'layered' character. Instead of just one level of inter- 
ventionary mechanisms — where a complementary but 
largely non-overlapping system results — it now seems to 
be deliberate policy to foster overlapping and even over­
layered mechanisms. What is more, such a system is 
emerging even though it is not official policy to foster it.
In part, this results from the struggles emerging between 
the privatised companies and their regulatory overseers. It 
also results from the way some of the de-nationalised 
companies have become increasingly predatory in terms 
of their competitors. The takeover by privatised British 
Petroleum of another privatised company, Britoil, and 
British Airways' takeover of its main domestic rival, British 
Caledonian Airways (both in 1987)) caused some disquiet 
and confirmed that 'competition' was no longer a serious 
objective of the government.
In connection with these cases and as an example of the 
trend towards a layered regulatory regime, we can point 
to the dual nature of the monopoly and merger legislation 
that applies to the UK — in the domestic sphere and again 
in the European sphere. Thus British Airways' bid for 
British Caledonian was referred to the European Commis­
sion after the domestic UK bodies failed to act. Similarly, 
the takeover proposal for the Rover Group by British 
Aerospace — again involving a recently de-nationalised 
company —was also referred to the European Commis­
sion. Again, the UK monopolies and merger legislation has 
been extended to include the remaining nationalised in­
dustries, which were previously exempt from this legisla­
tion. Other examples could be quoted.
One of the reasons advanced for this new layered approach 
is that it makes the capture of regulatory bodies by their 
regulated companies much more difficult. Although 
thoroughly exasperated by American writers, this 
phenomenon of 'regulatory capture' has struck a chord 
with UK policy makers as the UK embarks upon an 
American-type odyssey with 'regulatory intervention' (in­
stead of the now unfashionable nationalisation).
Rather paradoxically the 'new Right' Conservatives have 
presided over one of the most sustained and rapid inter- 
ventionary initiatives in British history. In general, it is 
clear that an approach to economic issues stressing a totally 
free-market, non-interventionary stance is on the defen­
sive. A new realistic Right has emerged to take the initiative 
in these matters, a Right which is more pragmatic and less 
doctrinaire.
Given the installation of extensive powers to determine the 
course of the post-privatised companies there seems no 
strong argument for re-nationalising any of them . With a 
strong regulatory body — which itself has control over 
pricing structure and which provides a proper account­
ability for their monopoly or near monopoly status— there 
is little need to embark on the politically hazardous course 
of re-nationalisation.
The better approach is to supplement and strengthen the 
now already existing structure. Very dramatic effects, for 
instance, could be had by increasing, or merely threatening 
to increase, the 'n' component of the 'RPI-n%' pricing 
formula discussed above. In addition, the government still 
holds a large part of many of the privatised company 
shares, and it could buy more on the open market if it 
wished. Given the well-known ability of consolidated 
shareholdings of 20% or so to secure effective control of 
private companies, it would be easy to secure such a 
shareholding to be invested in an independent trust com­
pany which could supervise a privatised company and 
which could be made up of a wide range of social interests. 
This would have the advantage of once and for all eliminat­
ing any residual element of state ownership from the post­
privatised industries.
How important any of these suggestions is for the 
Australian example remains to be seen. If there are any 
lessons to be learned they are twofold. First, devising a 
suitable regulatory structure is paramount. One will 
emerge or be imposed, regardless of the explicit intentions 
of policy makers. Secondly, this apparatus will have to 
contend with the business strategies devised by the 
privatised companies. British Telecom has set out to be­
come a major global communications company by pursu­
ing an acquisitions strategy in the US and elsewhere. 
Although this put considerable strain on its financial posi­
tion — recently it was thought to be technically insolvent 
as its investment commitments overwhelmed its cash-flo w 
and credit lines — it is probably a large enough company 
to achieve its aim. Can the same be said of Australia's 
Telecom or will it be swept up itself by a stronger com­
pany? Similarly with Qantas, a small airline by world 
standards. A number of airline companies have eyed Qan­
tas for possible acquisition, and its privatisation may 
present a golden opportunity for this unless watertight 
steps are taken in advance to prevent it.
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